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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.    
 One evening on St. Thomas, in the U.S. Virgin Islands 
(the V.I.), a minor dispute between two men over the use of a 
can opener escalated into each man menacingly showing the 
other his pistol.  After law enforcement officers looked into 
these events, a federal grand jury charged one of them, Rehelio 
Trant, with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm 
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in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Trant proceeded to trial 
and a jury found him guilty.  On appeal, Trant argues that his 
conviction should be vacated because the District Court 
impermissibly allowed the Government to reopen its case-in-
chief and also made two evidentiary errors.  Trant also 
contends that the record contains insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction.  Concluding that none of Trant’s 
challenges have merit, we will affirm the judgment. 
I.1 
In the fall of 2017, Rehelio Trant and Jimez Ashby had 
a heated encounter at a gas station in Bovoni, St. Thomas, that 
ended with each displaying his pistol to the other.  Trant 
wanted to use a can opener inside the gas station, but Ashby 
was at a counter and in his way.  Trant asked Ashby to move, 
but Ashby did not hear him.  Trant then yelled his request in 
Ashby’s ear.  Although Ashby complied, he admonished Trant 
for screaming at him.  The encounter seemed to have ended 
when the two men shook hands and Trant exited the store.  Yet 
Trant signaled Ashby to join him outside.  When Ashby did so, 
a breeze blew hard enough against Trant that Ashby, standing 
less than a car’s length away, was able to see Trant’s waistband 
tighten and the imprint of a gun against his body.  Ashby 
immediately brandished his firearm and backed away.  Then 
standing “a little more than a car length” from Ashby, Trant 
                                                 
1  Because Trant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting his conviction, we view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Government and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the jury’s guilty verdict.  See United 
States v. Fountain, 792 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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lifted up his shirt and revealed a gun in his waistband.  (App. 
61.)  Just then, a woman walked between the two men, and 
Trant left the gas station.  Ashby quickly called the police to 
report the incident.   
Several months later, a federal grand jury charged Trant 
with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.   
Before trial, the Government and Trant stipulated that he had a 
prior felony conviction.  In addition, Trant filed a motion in 
limine seeking the Court’s permission to inquire into “Ashby’s 
unlawful possession of two firearms for impeachment purposes 
which are probative of his character for untruthfulness.”  (App. 
24–25.)  The District Court deferred ruling on this motion until 
trial.  
At trial, the Government’s case included the testimony 
of Ashby and Sergeant Bernard Burke, the Supervisor of the 
Virgin Islands Police Department’s Firearms Unit.  Ashby 
described his encounter with Trant, and added that the light 
“was good” when he saw both the imprint of a gun in Trant’s 
waistband and Trant lift his shirt to expose the gun.  (App. 60, 
76–77.)  On cross examination, Ashby testified that he knew 
the imprint in Trant’s waistband was of a gun and recalled 
telling the police that Trant’s firearm “look[ed] like a Glock”—
a gun that Ashby said resembled his own Glock pistol.  (App. 
71.)  Trant’s counsel attempted to ask Ashby three questions 
about the unlawfulness of his possession of a firearm at the 
time of the altercation with Trant, but the District Court 
sustained, apparently under Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 
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609, the Government’s objections to these questions.2  The 
Government then called Sergeant Burke to testify that there are 
no firearm manufacturing facilities within the territorial 
boundaries of the V.I.  After that, the Government rested its 
case.   
Next, Trant moved under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29(a) for a judgment of acquittal.  The District 
Court, noting that the trial record lacked evidence that Trant 
was a convicted felon (a requirement for conviction under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), see United States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93, 
111 (3d Cir. 2018)), asked the prosecutor about the missing 
evidence to support this “essential element.”  (App. 84.)  She 
responded that she had forgotten to move the admission of the 
stipulation of Trant’s prior felony conviction.  The prosecutor 
then incorrectly asserted that she had “asked the Court prior to 
the jury coming in to address [the stipulation] and to inquire as 
to when that stipulation would be presented to the jury.” 3  
                                                 
2  The District Court did not reference any legal authority when 
ruling on the Government’s objections, but the Government 
cited Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 when it raised 
two of its three objections that the Court sustained.    
3  The record does not support the Government’s assertion that 
it had raised with the Court the admission of the stipulation.   
The prosecutor later acknowledged that she “did not tell the 
Court that the question [she] had about the stipulation was 
when to present it.”  (App. 89.)  The District Court “remind[ed] 
the parties to be cautious with your recollection[s] because it 
seems to me the [G]overnment’s recollection and recitation of 
what happened doesn’t comport with the record at all.”  (App. 
91.)   
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(App. 85.)  This left the Government with no alternative but to 
move to reopen its case-in-chief.  In support of its motion, the 
prosecutor argued that the Court should grant the motion 
because Trant would not suffer any prejudice from the 
admission of the stipulation.  Trant objected but offered no 
reason why the Court should deny the motion other than that 
“it’s too late” and “[t]he [G]overnment has rested.”  (App. 88.)     
The District Court granted the Government’s motion to 
reopen.  After the stipulation was admitted into evidence, the 
Government again rested.  Trant, not presenting any evidence 
of his own, also rested.   
The jury found Trant guilty of violating § 922(g)(1), and 
Trant was later sentenced to 71 months’ imprisonment and 
three years of supervised release.  Trant timely appealed.  
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), and we have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III. 
 On appeal, Trant raises three issues.  He contends that 
the District Court erred by granting the Government’s motion 
to reopen its case-in-chief and by restricting his cross 
examination of Ashby.  Trant also asserts that the record lacks 
the necessary evidence to support his conviction.  We reject 
each of his challenges.   
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A. 
 Trant argues that the District Court impermissibly 
granted the Government’s motion to reopen because the 
Government lacked a reasonable explanation for failing to 
present the stipulation during its case-in-chief.  Trant adds that 
“the [G]overnment added insult to injury by misrepresenting 
what had occurred.”  (Trant’s Br. at 21.)  He further contends 
that our review of the District Court’s ruling should “end” with 
the Government’s inadequate justification for failing to move 
the stipulation into evidence because, he implies, a reasonable 
explanation was necessary for reopening.  (Id. at 22.)  
Alternatively, Trant asserts that the Court abused its discretion 
by granting the motion because he was prejudiced by the 
reopening—i.e., he lost the opportunity to be acquitted based 
on the Government’s failure to prove that he is a convicted 
felon.   
1. 
 There is scarce authority in our circuit on the standard 
governing this Court’s review of a ruling on a motion to reopen 
the Government’s case-in-chief during a criminal trial.  We 
therefore take this opportunity to clarify and build upon our 
case law.4  When considering a party’s motion to reopen its 
                                                 
4  In multiple decisions, both precedential and non-
precedential, we have stated that “[t]he question of whether the 
[G]overnment may augment the record at a suppression 
hearing after a remand following the conviction of the 
defendant is analogous to the question of whether the 
[G]overnment may reopen its case after resting.”  United States 
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case at trial, “‘the district court’s primary focus should be on 
whether the party opposing reopening would be prejudiced if 
reopening is permitted.’”  United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 
176, 181 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Kithcart, 218 
F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 2000)) (explaining how district courts 
should approach ruling on motions to reopen a suppression 
hearing).  As in the suppression context, two principal 
considerations for the district court’s inquiry are the timing of 
the moving party’s request to reopen (whether, if the motion is 
granted, the opposing party will have a reasonable opportunity 
to rebut the moving party’s new evidence) and “the effect of 
the granting of the motion” (whether granting the motion will 
cause substantial disruption to the proceedings or result in the 
new evidence taking on “distorted importance”).  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Moreover, district 
courts should assess the reasonableness of the moving party’s 
explanation for failing to introduce the desired evidence before 
resting and whether the new evidence is admissible and has 
probative value.  See id.   
In adopting this standard, we join eight other circuits 
that have issued essentially the same guidance on how district 
courts should approach deciding motions to reopen at trial.  
                                                 
v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); United 
States v. Rey, 595 F. App’x 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2014) (same); 
United States v. Brown, 534 F. App’x 132, 136 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(same); see also United States v. Vastola, 915 F.2d 865, 876 
(3d Cir. 1990) (stating that ruling on a motion to reopen a 
suppression hearing after remand “is similar to … ruling on a 
motion by the [G]overnment to reopen”).    
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See United States v. Martinez, 872 F.3d 293, 298–99 (5th Cir. 
2017); United States v. Orozco, 764 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 
2014); United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 247–48 
(2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Nunez, 432 F.3d 573, 579 
(4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Byrd, 403 F.3d 1278, 1283–
88 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Peterson, 233 F.3d 101, 
106 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 
735, 741 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Larson, 596 F.2d 
759, 778 (8th Cir. 1979).  
 Although we have announced the standard governing 
motions to reopen at trial by referring to our suppression-
hearing case law, our statement that “‘courts should be 
extremely reluctant to grant reopenings,’” Coward, 296 F.3d 
at 180 (quoting Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 219 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)), does not apply to a district court’s 
consideration of a motion to reopen at trial.  Both Coward and 
Kithcart explained that this restraint on reopening applies to 
motions to reopen a suppression hearing.  See id.; Kithcart, 218 
F.3d at 219–20.  We conclude that any such caution against 
reopening the record in the trial context would constitute an 
anomalous constraint on a district court’s traditional and well-
understood exercise of its discretion.  See United States v. 
Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 167 n.21 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that 
district courts “have wide discretion in the management of their 
cases” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  
Coward and Kithcart recognize that “decisions to reopen 
proceedings are traditionally a discretionary matter for the 
district court.”  Coward, 296 F.3d at 180 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted); Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 219.  We 
will not, therefore, direct a district court to place a thumb on 
the scale by suggesting that reopening a trial record is 
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somehow disfavored, while at the same time giving lip service 
to our reliance upon the trial judge’s sound discretion.  In our 
view, this would only confuse a trial judge’s inquiry into 
whether or not to reopen, as well as our eventual review for 
abuse of discretion.    
 We add that our cautionary warning against reopening 
suppression hearings upon remand is not warranted in the trial 
context for three additional reasons.  First, in comparison to 
suppression hearings, trials present a greater need for district 
courts to be unconstrained in the exercise of their case-
management discretion.  Trials are fluid proceedings with a 
much wider horizon of evidence for district courts to consider 
than in suppression hearings, and courts enjoy broad discretion 
during trial precisely so that they can promptly and effectively 
respond to the varied and often unanticipated issues that may 
arise.  Cf. Schiff, 602 F.3d at 176 (noting district courts have 
“broad discretion” to engage in case management during trial).  
Second and relatedly, suppression hearings usually present 
fewer and more narrow issues than arise at trial.  That means 
that parties moving to reopen suppression hearings will 
generally have less justifiable reasons for failing to introduce 
the desired evidence into the record than parties moving to 
reopen at trial.  As Coward noted, “[r]eopening is often 
permitted to supply some technical requirement … or to supply 
some detail overlooked by inadvertence.”  296 F.3d at 182 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  We believe 
that, as exemplified by this case, there are more opportunities 
for technical requirements or details to be overlooked during 
the often high pressure of a trial proceeding than in a 
suppression hearing where a jury is never present.  Third, 
courts should not be distracted at trial by a suggestion that 
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reopening is disfavored, because deciding whether to allow the 
Government to reopen its case-in-chief will more often be 
outcome determinative (as in this case) than in the suppression-
following-remand context.  In the latter situation, the 
Government may be able, through time and investigative 
resources, to obtain alternative evidence to present at trial.  
This higher likelihood of reopening at trial being outcome 
determinative makes it even more critical that a district court 
apply our reopening standard in a straightforward manner, 
focusing first on prejudice to the party opposing the motion, 
while also considering the nature and probative value of the 
new evidence.  Quite simply, the purpose, procedure and 
pressures of a trial are way too different from the suppression 
hearing context to warrant application of a “one size fits all” 
approach to resolving a motion to reopen.5  
2. 
With this standard now defined, we turn to Trant’s 
argument that the District Court impermissibly granted the 
Government’s motion to reopen its case-in-chief.6  We agree 
                                                 
5  We do not consider here whether our statement in Coward 
and Kithcart instructing district courts to exercise extreme 
reluctance to grant reopening in suppression hearings after 
remand is dicta and accordingly not binding, even in that 
context.  It is enough to say that it is certainly not binding in 
the context of a trial.    
6  We review the District Court’s ruling on the Government’s 
motion to reopen by applying a straightforward abuse of 
discretion standard.  See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331–32 (1971). 
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with Trant that the Government’s reason for failing to 
introduce the stipulation before resting (it “simply forgot” 
(Gov. Br. at 16)) is hardly compelling.  But prejudice to the 
party objecting to reopening the trial record constitutes the 
primary consideration for a district court that must rule on a 
motion to reopen.  The Court was not required to deny the 
motion solely because the Government’s explanation was 
weak.  See United States v. Wrensford, 866 F.3d 76, 88 n.6 
(3d Cir. 2017) (“Reopening may … be permitted to allow the 
presentation of evidence about a technical matter overlooked 
by inadvertence.” (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)). 
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by granting the motion because Trant was not 
prejudiced by the Government’s reopening of its case-in-chief: 
the Government moved to reopen before Trant had the 
opportunity to present his evidence, thereby giving him the 
opportunity to respond and also limiting any disruption to the 
proceedings.7  See Coward, 296 F.3d at 181 (“Where, as in this 
case, reopening is permitted after the [G]overnment has rested 
its case in chief, but before the defendant has presented any 
evidence, it is unlikely that prejudice sufficient to establish an 
abuse of discretion can be established.” (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)).  And importantly, the object of 
the motion to reopen was the admission of a stipulation—Trant 
                                                 
7  The District Court did not provide an explanation for 
granting the Government’s motion to reopen.  We encourage 
district courts to articulate their reasons for a ruling on a motion 
to reopen at trial.    
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had agreed to it.8  See United States v. Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 
114 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the nonmoving parties were 
not prejudiced by the District Court’s granting a motion to 
reopen the record on remand because they had notice of the 
evidence to be offered and an opportunity to rebut the 
evidence).  Contrary to Trant’s assertion, prejudice in this 
context does not mean the loss of an opportunity for an 
unearned windfall.  Prejudice results when a party experiences 
an unfair or unreasonable impairment of his defense.  
See Smith, 751 F.3d at 114; Coward, 296 F.3d at 181.  Finally, 
we emphasize that the parties do not dispute that the stipulation 
was admissible and that it had significant probative value.9  A 
trial should be a solemn exercise in a search for truth, not a 
game of “gotcha.”  
B. 
 Trant next contends that the District Court committed 
two errors by preventing him from cross examining Ashby 
about his unlawful possession of a firearm.  First, Trant argues 
that the Court should have permitted him to question Ashby 
about this matter, suggesting it was probative of Ashby’s 
character for untruthfulness and necessary for the jury to 
evaluate Ashby’s credibility.  Trant asserts that Ashby’s own 
illegal activity gave him a reason to lie about Trant’s gun 
possession.  When Ashby called the police, Trant contends, he 
                                                 
8  The parties had filed on the District Court’s docket the 
stipulation that Trant had a prior felony conviction.    
9  We add that the District Court appropriately handled the 
Government’s misrepresentation regarding the admission of 
the stipulation. 
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wanted officers to focus on Trant’s criminal activity and not 
his own.  In support, Trant points to United States v. Estell, 539 
F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1976), for the proposition that “credibility 
may be attacked by showing specific instances of the witness’s 
prior misconduct, other than convictions, which bear on 
veracity.”  Id. at 700.    
 In implicitly applying Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion by restricting 
Trant from asking Ashby about his unlawful possession of a 
firearm.10  Under this Rule, the District Court had the discretion 
to allow Trant on cross examination to question Ashby about 
specific instances of conduct if they were probative of his 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.  See Fed. R. Evid. 
608(b); United States v. Williams, 464 F.3d 443, 448 (3d Cir. 
2006).  The District Court permissibly halted Trant’s proposed 
questioning because Ashby’s illegal possession of a firearm 
did not have any bearing on his character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness.  As the Tenth Circuit has explained, “[t]here is 
a point which constitutes a prosecution of the witness for the 
offense inquired about rather than a testing of his credibility 
and when that point is reached the court acts properly in closing 
down the questioning, for there is no valid interest to be served 
                                                 
10  We review the District Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.  
See United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 143 (3d Cir. 
2015).  The Government also objected to Trant’s proposed 
cross examination of Ashby under Federal Rule of Evidence 
609, but that Rule appears inapplicable here because, 
according to Trant, Ashby was not convicted of illegally 
possessing a firearm (for lacking a valid firearms license).  
See Fed. R. Evid. 609. 
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in shifting the emphasis from the accused person[] on trial to 
the witness.”  Estell, 539 F.2d at 699–700.  The Court did not 
err in preventing Trant from questioning Ashby about his 
unlawful possession of a firearm and thereby avoiding the 
concerns expressed in Estell. 
  Second, Trant argues that the District Court violated his 
rights under the Confrontation Clause, see U.S. Const. amend. 
VI, by not permitting him to cross examine Ashby about his 
unlawful possession of a firearm.  His questions, Trant 
contends, would have demonstrated Ashby’s bias against Trant 
and his motivation to lie.  Trant again suggests that because 
Ashby illegally had a gun during their encounter at the gas 
station, he had the motive to report Trant’s unlawful possession 
of a firearm to the police so as to distract law enforcement from 
his own criminal conduct.   Notably, Trant does not assert that 
Ashby testified pursuant to any agreement with the 
Government.       
Trant failed to raise this argument below, so we review 
for plain error.  See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–
34 (1993).11  The District Court did not plainly err because if 
                                                 
11  Under plain-error review, Trant must show that (1) an error 
occurred; (2) the error is “obvious”; and (3) the error “affected 
the outcome of the district court proceedings.”  United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  If Trant makes these showings, we exercise 
our discretion to award relief when the error “seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  Id. at 736 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
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Trant had been permitted to pursue his proposed cross 
examination, the jury would not have had “a significantly 
different impression” of Ashby’s credibility.  Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986); see also United States v. 
Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir. 2003).  Had the cross 
examination taken place, no reasonable jury could have 
believed that Ashby testified against Trant to avoid his own 
prosecution for illegally having a firearm.  And how could 
they?  It was Ashby himself who first called the police and 
reported to them that he had brandished his own firearm in the 
presence of Trant.  Trant’s proposed cross examination would 
not have given “the jury the facts from which jurors … could 
appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of” 
Ashby.  Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  And even if the restriction on cross 
examination was error, the implausible nature of Ashby’s 
having an ulterior motive for testifying hardly made it 
“obvious” that Trant had the right to ask Ashby about the 
latter’s illegal possession of a firearm.  Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.    
C. 
 Trant finally raises two arguments in support of his 
contention that the record lacks sufficient evidence to support 
his conviction.  First, he asserts that Ashby’s testimony lacks 
adequate specificity for a rational factfinder to determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the object Ashby saw in Trant’s 
possession fit the definition of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 921(a)(3).  Trant emphasizes that the object may not have 
been a firearm at all; alternatively, he suggests that “the object 
could have been an antique firearm which the statute 
specifically excludes as meeting the definition of a firearm.”  
 17 
 
(Trant Br. at 14.)  And during oral argument before us, Trant 
stressed that Ashby lacked the expertise and experience of a 
police officer in identifying firearms and that Ashby’s account 
lacked corroboration.   
 Ashby’s testimony, however, provides sufficient 
evidence to satisfy the requirement for a § 922(g)(1) conviction 
that a defendant possess a firearm as defined in § 921(a)(3).12  
When reviewing a jury verdict to determine whether the 
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the 
conviction, “we review the record in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of 
fact could have found proof of guilt[ ] beyond a reasonable 
doubt. … We must sustain the jury’s verdict if there is 
substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
government, to uphold the jury’s decision.”  United States v. 
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Here, Ashby testified that he saw, with good lighting at the 
scene of the offense, the imprint of a gun in Trant’s waistband 
and Trant revealing “his gun in his waist.”  (App. 61, 76–77.)  
Ashby further stated that he knew what he saw was a gun, 
describing it as a Glock that looked like one that he owned.  
When assessing this evidence in the light most favorable to the 
                                                 
12  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) defines a firearm as “(A) any weapon 
(including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may 
readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an 
explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; 
(C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any 
destructive device.  Such term does not include an antique 
firearm.” 
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Government, a rational trier of fact could determine beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Trant had a “weapon … which will or is 
designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile 
by the action of an explosive.”  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A).  
Cf. United States v. Beverly, 99 F.3d 570, 573 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(concluding that the testimony of a witness, who saw a 
defendant’s gun twice at a “close” range, provided “sufficient 
evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant utilized a 
firearm in the commission of his crime”).  Furthermore, we 
reject Trant’s antique-firearm defense, see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 921(a)(3) (excluding “an antique firearm” from the definition 
of a firearm), because he did not raise this affirmative defense 
in the District Court, nor did he offer any evidence suggesting 
that the gun Ashby saw was an antique firearm, as required by 
United States v. Lawrence, 349 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2003).   
Finally, we have never required that a firearm conviction be 
supported by the testimony of at least two witnesses or by a 
witness with firearms expertise equal to that of a police officer.  
See Beverly, 99 F.3d at 571–73 (only a mailman testified to 
seeing the defendant’s firearm).   
 Second, Trant contends that the Government failed to 
prove that his firearm traveled in interstate commerce—a 
required showing for a conviction under § 922(g)(1).  
See Foster, 891 F.3d at 111.  Sergeant Burke, Trant argues, 
could not have provided the necessary proof because “he was 
not given a gun to examine nor was he given the particular 
characteristics of [Trant’s] gun.”  (Trant Br. at 15–16.)    
But Sergeant Burke’s testimony was that there were no 
firearm manufacturers in the Virgin Islands.  That alone would 
justify a rational trier of fact in finding beyond a reasonable 
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doubt that Trant’s firearm traveled in interstate commerce.  
This Court has previously held that the testimony of Virgin 
Islands police officers can be sufficient to establish that, 
because particular goods were not manufactured in the Virgin 
Islands, their presence on the islands meant that they had been 
transported in interstate commerce.  See United States v. 
Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Lake, 150 F.3d 269, 273 (3d Cir. 1998).  Those holdings are 
applicable here.  Sergeant Burke’s testimony tracks that of 
Virgin Islands police officers in earlier cases in which we have 
deemed such testimony sufficient to establish that a particular 
good or product moved in interstate commerce.  Given 
Sergeant Burke’s testimony, a rational trier of fact would not 
need to examine Trant’s gun or its characteristics to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun traveled in interstate 
commerce.  See United States v. Buggs, 904 F.2d 1070, 1076 
(7th Cir. 1990) (“The fact that the gun was not produced at trial 
or that the witnesses did not have an opportunity to examine 
closely the weapon does not prevent conviction of a firearm 
offense.”). 
IV. 
We will affirm the judgment because sufficient 
evidence supports Trant’s conviction, and because the District 
Court did not err in either permitting the Government to reopen 
its case-in-chief or restricting Trant’s cross examination of 
Ashby. 
 
